TOC 
Network Working GroupP. Saint-Andre
Internet-DraftCisco
Intended status: Standards TrackApril 7, 2010
Expires: October 9, 2010 


Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Address Format
draft-ietf-xmpp-address-00

Abstract

This document defines the format for addresses used in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), including support for non-ASCII characters.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress.”

This Internet-Draft will expire on October 9, 2010.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.



Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
2.  Addresses
    2.1.  Overview
    2.2.  Domainpart
    2.3.  Localpart
    2.4.  Resourcepart
3.  Internationalization Considerations
4.  Security Considerations
    4.1.  Stringprep Profiles
    4.2.  Address Spoofing
        4.2.1.  Address Forging
        4.2.2.  Address Mimicking
5.  IANA Considerations
    5.1.  Nodeprep Profile of Stringprep
    5.2.  Resourceprep Profile of Stringprep
6.  Conformance Requirements
7.  References
    7.1.  Normative References
    7.2.  Informative References
Appendix A.  Nodeprep
    A.1.  Introduction
    A.2.  Character Repertoire
    A.3.  Mapping
    A.4.  Normalization
    A.5.  Prohibited Output
    A.6.  Bidirectional Characters
    A.7.  Notes
Appendix B.  Resourceprep
    B.1.  Introduction
    B.2.  Character Repertoire
    B.3.  Mapping
    B.4.  Normalization
    B.5.  Prohibited Output
    B.6.  Bidirectional Characters
Appendix C.  Differences From RFC 3920
Appendix D.  Copying Conditions
§  Index
§  Author's Address




 TOC 

1.  Introduction

The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol [XMPP] (Saint-Andre, P., “Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core,” March 2010.) is an application profile of the Extensible Markup Language [XML] (Paoli, J., Maler, E., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Yergeau, F., and T. Bray, “Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fourth Edition),” August 2006.) for streaming XML data in close to real time between any two or more network-aware entities. The address format for such entities was originally developed in the Jabber open-source community in 1999 (thus for historical reasons the native address of an XMPP entity is called a Jabber Identifier or JID). In essence, a JID contains up to three parts, in the arrangement <localpart@domainpart/resourcepart> (where the localpart and resourcepart are both discretionary and each part can contain nearly any Unicode code point, encoded according to [UTF‑8] (Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” November 2003.)). The JID format was first described by [XEP‑0029] (Kaes, C., “Definition of Jabber Identifiers (JIDs),” October 2003.) in 2002-2003, then defined canonically by [RFC3920] (Saint-Andre, P., Ed., “Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core,” October 2004.) in 2004. As defined in RFC 3920, the XMPP address format re-uses the "stringprep" technology for preparation of non-ASCII characters [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.), including the Nameprep profile for internationalized domain names as specified in [NAMEPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN),” March 2003.) and [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.) as well as two XMPP-specific profiles for the localpart and resourcepart. Since the publication of RFC 3920, IDNA2003 has been superseded by IDNA2008, and other protocols that use stringprep (including XMPP) have begun to migrate away from that technology. Because work on improved handling of internationalized addresses is currently in progress, specifying the XMPP address format in the revisions to RFC 3920 would unacceptably delay the revision process. Therefore, this specification provides documentation of the XMPP address format from RFC 3920, with the intent that it can be superseded once work on a new approach to internationalization is complete.



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2.  Addresses



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2.1.  Overview

An ENTITY is anything that is network-addressable and that can communicate using XMPP. For historical reasons, the native address of an XMPP entity is called a JABBER IDENTIFIER or JID. A valid JID contains a set of ordered elements formed of an XMPP localpart, domainpart, and resourcepart.

The syntax for a JID is defined as follows using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form as specified in [ABNF] (Crocker, D. and P. Overell, “Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF,” January 2008.).

   jid             = [ localpart "@" ] domain [ "/" resource ]
   localpart       = 1*(nodepoint)
                     ; a "nodepoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode code
                     ; point that satisfies the Nodeprep profile of
                     ; stringprep
   domain          = fqdn / address-literal
   fqdn            = *(ldhlabel ".") toplabel
   ldhlabel        = letdig [*61(ldh) letdig]
   toplabel        = ALPHA   *61(ldh) letdig
   letdig          = ALPHA / DIGIT
   ldh             = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-"
   address-literal = IPv4address / IPv6address
                     ; the "IPv4address" and "IPv6address" rules are
                     ; defined in RFC 3986
   resource        = 1*(resourcepoint)
                     ; a "resourcepoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode
                     ; code point that satisfies the Resourceprep
                     ; profile of stringprep

All JIDs are based on the foregoing structure. One common use of this structure is to identify a messaging and presence account, the server that hosts the account, and a connected resource (e.g., a specific device) in the form of <localpart@domain/resource>. However, localparts other than clients are possible; for example, a specific chat room offered by a multi-user conference service (see [XEP‑0045] (Saint-Andre, P., “Multi-User Chat,” January in progress, last updated 2010.)) could be addressed as <room@service> (where "room" is the name of the chat room and "service" is the hostname of the multi-user conference service) and a specific occupant of such a room could be addressed as <room@service/nick> (where "nick" is the occupant's room nickname). Many other JID types are possible (e.g., <domain/resource> could be a server-side script or service).

Each allowable portion of a JID (localpart, domainpart, and resourcepart) MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length, resulting in a maximum total size (including the '@' and '/' separators) of 3071 bytes.

Note: While the format of a JID is consistent with [URI] (Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January 2005.), an entity's address on an XMPP network MUST be represented as a JID (without a URI scheme) and not a [URI] (Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January 2005.) or [IRI] (Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, “Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs),” January 2005.) as specified in [XMPP‑URI] (Saint-Andre, P., “Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP),” February 2008.); the latter specification is provided only for identification and interaction outside the context of the XMPP wire protocol itself.



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2.2.  Domainpart

The DOMAINPART of a JID is that portion after the '@' character (if any) and before the '/' character (if any); it is the primary identifier and is the only REQUIRED element of a JID (a mere domainpart is a valid JID). Typically a domainpart identifies the "home" server to which clients connect for XML routing and data management functionality. However, it is not necessary for an XMPP domainpart to identify an entity that provides core XMPP server functionality (e.g., a domainpart can identity an entity such as a multi-user conference service, a publish-subscribe service, or a user directory).

Note: A single server can service multiple domainparts, i.e., multiple local domains; this is typically referred to as virtual hosting.

The domainpart for every server or service that will communicate over a network SHOULD be a fully qualified domain name (see [DNS] (Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” November 1987.)); while the domainpart MAY be either an Internet Protocol (IPv4 or IPv6) address or a text label that is resolvable on a local network (commonly called an "unqualified hostname"), it is possible that domainparts that are IP addresses will not be acceptable to other services for the sake of interdomain communication. Furthermore, domainparts that are unqualified hostnames MUST NOT be used on public networks but MAY be used on private networks.

Note: If the domainpart includes a final character considered to be a label separator (dot) by [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.) or [DNS] (Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” November 1987.), this character MUST be stripped from the domainpart before the JID of which it is a part is used for the purpose of routing an XML stanza, comparing against another JID, or constructing an [XMPP‑URI] (Saint-Andre, P., “Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP),” February 2008.); in particular, the character MUST be stripped before any other canonicalization steps are taken, such as application of the [NAMEPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN),” March 2003.) profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) or completion of the ToASCII operation as described in [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.).

A domainpart MUST be an "internationalized domain name" as defined in [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.), that is, "a domain name in which every label is an internationalized label". When preparing a text label (consisting of a sequence of Unicode code points) for representation as an internationalized label in the process of constructing an XMPP domainpart or comparing two XMPP domainparts, an application MUST ensure that for each text label it is possible to apply without failing the ToASCII operation specified in [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.) with the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag set (thus forbidding ASCII code points other than letters, digits, and hyphens). If the ToASCII operation can be applied without failing, then the label is an internationalized label. An internationalized domain name (and therefore an XMPP domainpart) is constructed from its constituent internationalized labels by following the rules specified in [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.).

Note: The ToASCII operation includes application of the [NAMEPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN),” March 2003.) profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) and encoding using the algorithm specified in [PUNYCODE] (Costello, A., “Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.); for details, see [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.). Although the output of the ToASCII operation is not used in XMPP, it MUST be possible to apply that operation without failing.

In the terms of IDNA2008 [IDNA‑DEFS] (Klensin, J., “Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework,” January 2010.), the domainpart of a JID is a "domain name slot".



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2.3.  Localpart

The LOCALPART of a JID is an optional identifier placed before the domainpart and separated from the latter by the '@' character. Typically a localpart uniquely identifies the entity requesting and using network access provided by a server (i.e., a local account), although it can also represent other kinds of entities (e.g., a chat room associated with a multi-user conference service). The entity represented by an XMPP localpart is addressed within the context of a specific domain.

A localpart MUST NOT be zero bytes in length and, as for all portions of a JID, MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length.

A localpart MUST be formatted such that the Nodeprep profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) can be applied without failing (see Appendix A (Nodeprep)). Before comparing two localparts, an application MUST first ensure that the Nodeprep profile has been applied to each identifier (the profile need not be applied each time a comparison is made, as long as it has been applied before comparison).



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2.4.  Resourcepart

The resourcepart of a JID is an optional identifier placed after the domainpart and separated from the latter by the '/' character. A resourcepart can modify either a <localpart@domain> address or a mere <domain> address. Typically a resourcepart uniquely identifies a specific connection (e.g., a device or location) or object (e.g., a participant in a multi-user conference room) belonging to the entity associated with an XMPP localpart at a local domain.

When an XMPP address does not include a resourcepart (i.e., when it is of the form <domain> or <localpart@domain>), it is referred to as a BARE JID. When an XMPP address includes a resourcepart (i.e., when it is of the form <domain/resource> or <localpart@domain/resource>), is referred to as a FULL JID.

A resourcepart MUST NOT be zero bytes in length and, as for all portions of a JID, MUST NOT be more than 1023 bytes in length.

A resourcepart MUST be formatted such that the Resourceprep profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) can be applied without failing (see Appendix B (Resourceprep)). Before comparing two resourceparts, an application MUST first ensure that the Resourceprep profile has been applied to each identifier (the profile need not be applied each time a comparison is made, as long as it has been applied before comparison).

Note: For historical reasons, the term "resource identifier" is often used in XMPP to refer to the optional portion of an XMPP address that follows the domainpart and the "/" separator character; to help prevent confusion between an XMPP "resource identifier" and the meanings of "resource" and "identifier" provided in Section 1.1 of [URI] (Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January 2005.), this specification typically uses the term "resourcepart" instead of "resource identifier" (as in RFC 3920).

XMPP entities SHOULD consider resourceparts to be opaque strings and SHOULD NOT impute meaning to any given resourcepart. In particular, the use of the '/' character as a separator between the domainpart and the resourcepart does not imply that XMPP addresses are hierarchical in the way that, say, HTTP addresses are hierarchical; thus for example an XMPP address of the form <localpart@domain/foo/bar> does not identify a resource "bar" that exists below a resource "foo" in a hierarchy of resources associated with the entity "localpart@domain".



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3.  Internationalization Considerations

An XMPP server MUST support and enforce [IDNA2003] (Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” March 2003.) for domainparts, the Nodeprep (Nodeprep) profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) for localparts, and the Resourceprep (Resourceprep) profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) for resourceparts; this enables XMPP addresses to include a wide variety of Unicode characters outside the US-ASCII range.



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4.  Security Considerations



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4.1.  Stringprep Profiles

XMPP makes use of the [NAMEPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN),” March 2003.) profile of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.) for processing of domainparts; for security considerations related to Nameprep, refer to the appropriate section of [NAMEPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN),” March 2003.).

In addition, XMPP defines two profiles of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.): Nodeprep (Nodeprep) for localparts and Resourceprep (Resourceprep) for resourceparts.

The Unicode and ISO/IEC 10646 repertoires have many characters that look similar. In many cases, users of security protocols might perform visual matching, such as when comparing the names of trusted third parties. Because it is impossible to map similar-looking characters without a great deal of context (such as knowing the fonts used), stringprep does nothing to map similar-looking characters together, nor to prohibit some characters because they look like others.

A localpart can be employed as one part of an entity's address in XMPP. One common usage is as the username of an instant messaging user; another is as the name of a multi-user conference room; and many other kinds of entities could use localparts as part of their addresses. The security of such services could be compromised based on different interpretations of the internationalized localpart; for example, a user entering a single internationalized localpart could access another user's account information, or a user could gain access to a hidden or otherwise restricted chat room or service.

A resourcepart can be employed as one part of an entity's address in XMPP. One common usage is as the name for an instant messaging user's connected resource; another is as the nickname of a user in a multi-user conference room; and many other kinds of entities could use resourceparts as part of their addresses. The security of such services could be compromised based on different interpretations of the internationalized resourcepart; for example, a user could attempt to initiate multiple connections with the same name, or a user could send a message to someone other than the intended recipient in a multi-user conference room.



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4.2.  Address Spoofing

As discussed in [XEP‑0165] (Saint-Andre, P., “Best Practices to Prevent JID Mimicking,” December 2007.), there are two forms of address spoofing: forging and mimicking.



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4.2.1.  Address Forging

In the context of XMPP technologies, address forging occurs when an entity is able to generate an XML stanza whose 'from' address does not correspond to the account credentials with which the entity authenticated onto the network (or an authorization identity provided during SASL negotiation). For example, address forging occurs if an entity that authenticated as "juliet@im.example.com" is able to send XML stanzas from "nurse@im.example.com" or "romeo@example.net".

Address forging is difficult in XMPP systems, given the requirement for sending servers to stamp 'from' addresses and for receiving servers to verify sending domains via server-to-server authentication. However, address forging is not impossible, since a rogue server could forge JIDs at the sending domain by ignoring the stamping requirement. A rogue server could even forge JIDs at other domains by means of a DNS poisoning attack if [DNSSEC] (Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “DNS Security Introduction and Requirements,” March 2005.) is not used. This specification does not define methods for discovering or counteracting such rogue servers.

Note: An entity outside the security perimeter of a particular server cannot reliably distinguish between bare JIDs of the form <localpart@domain> at that server, since the server could forge any such JID; therefore only the domainpart can be authenticated or authorized with any level of assurance.



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4.2.2.  Address Mimicking

Address mimicking occus when an entity provides legitimate authentication credentials for and sends XML stanzas from an account whose JID appears to a human user to be the same as another JID. For example, in some XMPP clients the address "paypa1@example.org" (spelled with the number one as the final character of the localpart) might appear to be the same as "paypal@example.org (spelled with the lower-case version of the letter "L"), especially on casual visual inspection; this phenomenon is sometimes called "typejacking". A more sophisticated example of address mimicking might involve the use of characters from outside the US-ASCII range, such as the Cherokee characters U+13DA U+13A2 U+13B5 U+13AC U+13A2 U+13AC U+13D2 instead of the US-ASCII characters "STPETER".

In some examples of address mimicking, it is unlikely that the average user could tell the difference between the real JID and the fake JID. (Naturally, there is no way to distinguish with full certainty which is the fake JID and which is the real JID; in some communication contexts, the JID with Cherokee characters might be the real JID and the JID with US-ASCII characters might thus appear to be the fake JID.) Because JIDs can contain almost any Unicode character, it can be relatively easy to mimic some JIDs in XMPP systems. The possibility of address mimicking introduces security vulnerabilities of the kind that have also plagued the World Wide Web, specifically the phenomenon known as phishing.

Mimicked addresses that involve characters from only one character set or from the character set typically employed by a particular user are not easy to combat (e.g., the simple typejacking attack previously described, which relies on a surface similarity between the characters "1" and "l" in some presentations). However, mimicked addresses that involve characters from more than one character set, or from a character set not typically employed by a particular user, can be mitigated somewhat through intelligent presentation. In particular, every human user of an XMPP technology presumably has a preferred language (or, in some cases, a small set of preferred languages), which an XMPP application SHOULD gather either explicitly from the user or implicitly via the operating system of the user's device. Furthermore, every language has a range (or a small set of ranges) of characters normally used to represent that language in textual form. Therefore, an XMPP application SHOULD warn the user when presenting a JID that uses characters outside the normal range of the user's preferred language(s). This recommendation is not intended to discourage communication across language communities; instead, it recognizes the existence of such language communities and encourages due caution when presenting unfamiliar character sets to human users.

For more detailed recommendations regarding prevention of address mimicking in XMPP systems, refer to [XEP‑0165] (Saint-Andre, P., “Best Practices to Prevent JID Mimicking,” December 2007.).



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5.  IANA Considerations

The following sections update the registrations provided in [RFC3920] (Saint-Andre, P., Ed., “Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core,” October 2004.).



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5.1.  Nodeprep Profile of Stringprep

The Nodeprep profile of stringprep is defined under Nodeprep (Nodeprep). The IANA has registered Nodeprep in the stringprep profile registry.

Name of this profile:

Nodeprep

RFC in which the profile is defined:

XXXX

Indicator whether or not this is the newest version of the profile:

This is the first version of Nodeprep


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5.2.  Resourceprep Profile of Stringprep

The Resourceprep profile of stringprep is defined under Resourceprep (Resourceprep). The IANA has registered Resourceprep in the stringprep profile registry.

Name of this profile:

Resourceprep

RFC in which the profile is defined:

XXXX

Indicator whether or not this is the newest version of the profile:

This is the first version of Resourceprep


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6.  Conformance Requirements

This section describes a protocol feature set that summarizes the conformance requirements of this specification. This feature set is appropriate for use in software certification, interoperability testing, and implementation reports. For each feature, this section provides the following information:

Note: The feature set specified here attempts to adhere to the concepts and formats proposed by Larry Masinter within the IETF's NEWTRK Working Group in 2005, as captured in [INTEROP] (Masinter, L., “Formalizing IETF Interoperability Reporting,” October 2005.). Although this feature set is more detailed than called for by [REPORTS] (Dusseault, L. and R. Sparks, “Guidance on Interoperation and Implementation Reports for Advancement to Draft Standard,” September 2009.), it provides a suitable basis for the generation of implementation reports to be submitted in support of advancing this specification from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard in accordance with [PROCESS] (Bradner, S., “The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3,” October 1996.).

Feature:
address-domain-length
Description:
Ensure that the domainpart of an XMPP address is limited to 1023 bytes in length.
Section:
Section 2.2 (Domainpart)
Roles:
Both MUST.

Feature:
address-domain-prep
Description:
Ensure that the domainpart of an XMPP address conforms to the Nameprep profile of Stringprep.
Section:
Section 2.2 (Domainpart)
Roles:
Client SHOULD, Server MUST.

Feature:
address-localpart-length
Description:
Ensure that the localpart of an XMPP address is limited to 1023 bytes in length.
Section:
Section 2.3 (Localpart)
Roles:
Both MUST.

Feature:
address-localpart-prep
Description:
Ensure that the localpart of an XMPP address conforms to the Nodeprep profile of Stringprep.
Section:
Section 2.3 (Localpart)
Roles:
Client SHOULD, Server MUST.

Feature:
address-resource-length
Description:
Ensure that the resourcepart of an XMPP address is limited to 1023 bytes in length.
Section:
Section 2.4 (Resourcepart)
Roles:
Both MUST.

Feature:
address-resource-prep
Description:
Ensure that the resourcepart of an XMPP address conforms to the Resourceprep profile of Stringprep.
Section:
Section 2.2 (Domainpart)
Roles:
Client SHOULD, Server MUST.



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7.  References



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7.1. Normative References

[ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, “Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF,” STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008 (TXT).
[IDNA2003] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” RFC 3490, March 2003 (TXT).
[NAMEPREP] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN),” RFC 3491, March 2003 (TXT).
[STRINGPREP] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” RFC 3454, December 2002 (TXT).
[TERMS] Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, “The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0,” 2000.

The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0 is defined by The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0 (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), as amended by the Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).

[UTF-8] Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646,” STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003 (TXT).
[XMPP] Saint-Andre, P., “Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core,” draft-ietf-xmpp-3920bis-06 (work in progress), March 2010 (TXT).


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7.2. Informative References

[DNS] Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - implementation and specification,” STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987 (TXT).
[DNSSEC] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, “DNS Security Introduction and Requirements,” RFC 4033, March 2005 (TXT).
[IDNA-DEFS] Klensin, J., “Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework,” draft-ietf-idnabis-defs-13 (work in progress), January 2010 (TXT).
[INTEROP] Masinter, L., “Formalizing IETF Interoperability Reporting,” draft-ietf-newtrk-interop-reports-00 (work in progress), October 2005 (TXT).
[IRI] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, “Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs),” RFC 3987, January 2005 (TXT).
[PROCESS] Bradner, S., “The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3,” BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996 (TXT).
[PUNYCODE] Costello, A., “Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA),” RFC 3492, March 2003 (TXT).
[REPORTS] Dusseault, L. and R. Sparks, “Guidance on Interoperation and Implementation Reports for Advancement to Draft Standard,” BCP 9, RFC 5657, September 2009 (TXT).
[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., “Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core,” RFC 3920, October 2004 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[URI] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005 (TXT, HTML, XML).
[XEP-0029] Kaes, C., “Definition of Jabber Identifiers (JIDs),” XSF XEP 0029, October 2003.
[XEP-0030] Hildebrand, J., Millard, P., Eatmon, R., and P. Saint-Andre, “Service Discovery,” XSF XEP 0030, June 2008.
[XEP-0045] Saint-Andre, P., “Multi-User Chat,” XSF XEP 0045, January in progress, last updated 2010.
[XEP-0060] Millard, P., Saint-Andre, P., and R. Meijer, “Publish-Subscribe,” XSF XEP 0060, September 2008.
[XEP-0165] Saint-Andre, P., “Best Practices to Prevent JID Mimicking,” XSF XEP 0165, December 2007.
[XEP-0271] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Meijer, “XMPP Nodes,” XSF XEP 0271, June 2009.
[XML] Paoli, J., Maler, E., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Yergeau, F., and T. Bray, “Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fourth Edition),” World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-20060816, August 2006 (HTML).
[XMPP-URI] Saint-Andre, P., “Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP),” RFC 5122, February 2008 (TXT).


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Appendix A.  Nodeprep



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A.1.  Introduction

This appendix defines the "Nodeprep" profile of stringprep. As such, it specifies processing rules that will enable users to enter internationalized localparts in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) and have the highest chance of getting the content of the strings correct. (An XMPP localpart is the optional portion of an XMPP address that precedes an XMPP domainpart and the '@' separator; it is often but not exclusively associated with an instant messaging username.) These processing rules are intended only for XMPP localparts and are not intended for arbitrary text or any other aspect of an XMPP address.

This profile defines the following, as required by [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.):



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A.2.  Character Repertoire

This profile uses Unicode 3.2 with the list of unassigned code points being Table A.1, both defined in Appendix A of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).



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A.3.  Mapping

This profile specifies mapping using the following tables from [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.):

Table B.1
Table B.2


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A.4.  Normalization

This profile specifies the use of Unicode normalization form KC, as described in [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).



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A.5.  Prohibited Output

This profile specifies the prohibition of using the following tables from [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).

Table C.1.1
Table C.1.2
Table C.2.1
Table C.2.2
Table C.3
Table C.4
Table C.5
Table C.6
Table C.7
Table C.8
Table C.9

In addition, the following additional Unicode characters are also prohibited:

U+0022 (QUOTATION MARK), i.e., "
U+0026 (AMPERSAND), i.e., &
U+0027 (APOSTROPHE), i.e., '
U+002F (SOLIDUS), i.e., /
U+003A (COLON), i.e., :
U+003C (LESS-THAN SIGN), i.e., <
U+003E (GREATER-THAN SIGN), i.e., >
U+0040 (COMMERCIAL AT), i.e., @



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A.6.  Bidirectional Characters

This profile specifies checking bidirectional strings, as described in Section 6 of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).



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A.7.  Notes

Because the additional characters prohibited by Nodeprep are prohibited after normalization, an implementation MUST NOT enable a human user to input any Unicode code point whose decomposition includes those characters; such code points include but are not necessarily limited to the following (refer to [UNICODE] (The Unicode Consortium, “The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0,” 2000.) for complete information).



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Appendix B.  Resourceprep



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B.1.  Introduction

This appendix defines the "Resourceprep" profile of stringprep. As such, it specifies processing rules that will enable users to enter internationalized resourceparts in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) and have the highest chance of getting the content of the strings correct. (An XMPP resourcepart is the optional portion of an XMPP address that follows an XMPP domainpart and the '/' separator.) These processing rules are intended only for XMPP resourceparts and are not intended for arbitrary text or any other aspect of an XMPP address.

This profile defines the following, as required by [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.):



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B.2.  Character Repertoire

This profile uses Unicode 3.2 with the list of unassigned code points being Table A.1, both defined in Appendix A of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).



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B.3.  Mapping

This profile specifies mapping using the following tables from [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.):

Table B.1


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B.4.  Normalization

This profile specifies the use of Unicode normalization form KC, as described in [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).



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B.5.  Prohibited Output

This profile specifies the prohibition of using the following tables from [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).

Table C.1.2
Table C.2.1
Table C.2.2
Table C.3
Table C.4
Table C.5
Table C.6
Table C.7
Table C.8
Table C.9


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B.6.  Bidirectional Characters

This profile specifies checking bidirectional strings, as described in Section 6 of [STRINGPREP] (Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, “Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep"),” December 2002.).



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Appendix C.  Differences From RFC 3920

Based on consensus derived from implementation and deployment experience as well as formal interoperability testing, the following substantive modifications were made from RFC 3920.



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Appendix D.  Copying Conditions

Regarding this entire document or any portion of it, the author makes no guarantees and is not responsible for any damage resulting from its use. The author grants irrevocable permission to anyone to use, modify, and distribute it in any way that does not diminish the rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it, provided that redistributed derivative works do not contain misleading author or version information. Derivative works need not be licensed under similar terms.



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Index

B 
 Bare JID
D 
 Domainpart
E 
 Entity
F 
 Full JID
J 
 Jabber Identifier
L 
 Localpart
R 
 Resourcepart


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Author's Address

  Peter Saint-Andre
  Cisco
Email:  psaintan@cisco.com