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1 Introduction

This document is one of two proposals for digital signatures in XMPP. It is expected that only one of these proposals be progressed beyond Experimental on the Standards Track. This document provides a technical specification for Digital Signatures in Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) based upon End-to-End Object Encryption (E2EEncrypt) "work in progress".

The S/MIME approach defined in RFC 3923 has never been implemented in XMPP clients to the best of our knowledge, but has some attractive features, especially the ability to store-and-forward a signed message at a user’s server if the user is not online when the message is received (in the XMPP community this is called "offline storage" and the message is referred to as an "offline message"). The authors surmise that RFC 3923 has not been implemented mainly because it adds several new dependencies to XMPP clients, especially MIME (along with the CPIM and MSGFMT media types).

This document explores the possibility of an approach that is similar to but simpler than RFC 3923. Like the approach detailed in RFC 3923, the approach utilizes encapsulating digital signatures. Like other encapsulating signature approaches (e.g., Current Jabber OpenPGP Usage (XEP-0027)), this approach does not support optimistic signing.

2 Signing XMPP Stanzas

The process that a sending agent follows for securing stanzas is very similar regardless of the form of stanza (i.e., <iq/>, <message/>, or <presence/>).

1. Constructs a cleartext version of the stanza, S.

2. Notes the current UTC date and time N when this stanza is constructed, formatted as described in Section 5.

3. Converts the stanza to a UTF-8, as defined by RFC 3629, encoded string, optionally removing line breaks and other insignificant whitespace between elements and attributes, i.e., UTF8-encode(S) = S’. We call S’ a "stanza-string" because for purposes of signing and verification it is treated not as XML but as an opaque string (this avoids the need for complex canonicalization of the XML input).

---

4. Constructs a plaintext envelope (E) <plain/> qualified by the "urn:xmpp:signed:0" namespace as follows:
   - The attribute 'timestamp' set to the UTC date and time value N
   - The XML character data set to the base64-encoded form of S' (where the encoding adheres to the definition in Section 4 of BASE64 [6] and where the padding bits are set to zero). This encoding is necessary to preserve a canonicalized form of S'.

5. Converts the envelope (E) to a UTF-8 encoded string, optionally removing line breaks and other insignificant whitespace between elements and attributes, i.e., E' = UTF8-encode(E).

6. Produce a signature of UTF8-encoded envelope (E') using the intended signature algorithm. T = signature(E'). (This step is underspecified and will be expanded upon in later revision of this document.)

7. Base64-encodes T to produce the signature data T'.

8. Constructs an <signed/> element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:signed:0" namespace as follows:
   - The child element <signature> (implicitly qualified by the "urn:xmpp:signed:0" namespace) as follows:
     - The attribute 'algorithm' set to a string identifying the signature algorithm used.
     - The XML character data T'.
   - The child element <data> (implicitly qualified by the "urn:xmpp:signed:0" namespace) as follows:
     - The XML character data E'.

9. Sends the <signed> element as the payload of a stanza that SHOULD match the stanza from step 1 in kind (e.g., <message/>), type (e.g., "chat"), and addressing (e.g. to="romeo@montague.net" from="juliet@capulet.net/balcony"). If the original stanza (S) has a value for the "id" attribute, this stanza MUST NOT use the same value for its "id" attribute.

2.1 Example of Signing Messages

The sender begins with the cleartext version of the <message/> stanza "S":

```xml
<message xmlns='jabber:client'
         from='juliet@capulet.net/balcony'
         id='183ef129'
         to='romeo@montague.net'/>
```

The sender then performs the steps 1 through 4 from above to generate:

```
<plain xmlns="urn:xmpp:signed:0"

timestamp="2010-06-29T02:15:21.012Z">
PG11c3NhZ2UgeGIsbnM9ImphYmJlcjpjbGl1bnQ1IGZybd209Imp1bGl1dEBjYXBB
1bGV0Lm51dC91YWxjb255I0b0z01icm9tZW9AbW9udGVndWUubmV0I0b0eXB1PS
JjaGF0i48dGhyZWFkPmM2HzczODI0LWEzMDctNDBkZC04ZmUwLWJhZDZ1NzI5O
WFkMDwgdGhyZWFkPjxb2R5PloZjXJZm9yZSBhcnQgdGhvSwgUm9tZW8/PC9i
b2R5jwvBVzc2FnZT4=
</plain>
```

And then performs steps 5 through 9 steps, causing the following to be sent:

```
<message xmlns='jabber:client'

from='juliet@capulet.net/balcony'

id='64f0ed123'

to='romeo@montague.net'

type='chat'>

<signed xmlns='urn:xmpp:signed:0'>

<signature algorithm='RSA-SHA1'>
DxbxIziY1CIYtcxkJ0IFLsfmDLmv96JM1MAQZ7jh49Ibs0IPsxI2LyLmQhKH
/994UJDJKQLHvLjz
GAmw8V2b+zmyZeItJzSmB+
HHilFVXKD2Dd4JfetsafsfsfIcb7uNWg0gAeiKrTHffgiyEC/2WxwOj3
JUMRy9ykEPiZsO0GZ/k=
</signature>

<data>
PHBsYWluIHHtbG5zPSJ1cm46eG1wcDPzaWduZWQ6CMICgdGl1ZXN0YW1wPSlyMQEwLTAlT15VDAy
OjE10j1XjAxMloIPgogIFBMWHxjmM5oWjJVZ2VHMXNik05SW1waFltSmxjanBqYkdsbGJuUW1J
R1p5YjIwOUItcDFIr2xsZEVCAlyYQgogIDFIr1ywTG01bGR0OW1ZV3hqYjI1NU0qjBiejBpY205
dFp0UUFiVz11ZEwbrmRXVVbVYwSwb1CMGVYQmxQUwogIEpquYdGME1qNDhR2h5WldGa1BtTTJN
emN6T0RJMEeXRxpNNG0TkrCa1pDMDRabVV3TFDkEwmx0ekk1TwogIFdGaG1Ed3ZkR2h5WldG
a1BqeGliM1I1UQxkb1pYSmxabT15WNCaGmUWdkR2h2ZFN3Z1V0XRaVzgvUEM5aQogIGlyUijYVQ
and2YldWemMyRm5aDQ9CjwvCghaW4+Cg==
</data>
</signed>
</message>
```
2.2 Example of Securing IQs
To be added....

3 Interaction with Stanza Semantics

The following limitations and caveats apply:

- Undirected <presence/> stanzas SHOULD NOT be signed.
- Stanzas directed to multiplexing services (e.g. multi-user chat) SHOULD NOT be signed, unless the sender has established the service supports the handling of signed stanzas.

4 Handling of Inbound Stanzas

Several scenarios are possible when an entity receives an encrypted stanza:

Case #1: The receiving application does not understand the protocol.

Case #2: The receiving application understands the protocol and is able to verify the signature.

Case #3: The receiving application understands the protocol and is able to verify the signature, but the timestamps fail the checks specified under Checking of Timestamps.

Case #4: The receiving application understands the protocol and is unable to verify the signature.

In Case #1, the receiving application MUST do one and only one of the following: (1) ignore the <signed/> extension, (2) ignore the entire stanza, or (3) except where precluded by the protocol (RFC 6120), return a <service-unavailable/> error to the sender.

In Case #2, the receiving application MUST NOT return a stanza error to the sender, since this is the success case.

In Case #3, the receiving application MAY, except where precluded by the protocol, return a <not-acceptable/> error to the sender, optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of <bad-timestamp/> as shown below:

```xml
<message
  from='romeo@example.net/orchard'
  id='6410ed123'
  to='juliet@capulet.net/balcony'
  type='error'>
</message>
```

In Case #4, the receiving application SHOULD, except as precluded by the protocol, return a <bad-request/> error to the sender, optionally supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of <bad-signature/> as shown below:

Additionally in Case #4, the receiving application SHOULD NOT present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application) and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza (which may be to display a message informing the recipient that it has received a stanza that cannot be verified).

### 5 Inclusion and Checking of Timestamps

Timestamps are included to help prevent replay attacks. All timestamps MUST conform to [DATETIME](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3339) and be presented as UTC with no offset, always including the seconds and fractions of a second to three digits (resulting in a datetime 24 characters in length). Absent a local adjustment to the sending agent’s perceived time or the underlying clock time, the sending agent MUST ensure that the timestamps it sends to the receiver increase monotonically (if necessary by incrementing the seconds fraction in the timestamp if the clock returns the same time for multiple requests). The following rules apply to the receiving application:

- It MUST verify that the timestamp received is within five minutes of the current time, except as described below for offline messages.

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If the foregoing check fails, the timestamp SHOULD be presented to the receiving entity (human or application) marked with descriptive text indicating "old timestamp" or "future timestamp" and the receiving entity MAY return a stanza error to the sender (except as precluded in the protocol).

The foregoing timestamp checks assume that the recipient is online when the message is received. However, if the recipient is offline then the server will probably store the message for delivery when the recipient is next online (offline storage does not apply to <iq/> or <presence/> stanzas, only <message/> stanzas). As described in Best Practices for Handling Offline Messages (XEP-0160)\(^9\), when sending an offline message to the recipient, the server SHOULD include delayed delivery data as specified in Delayed Delivery (XEP-0203)\(^10\) so that the recipient knows that this is an offline message and also knows the original time of receipt at the server. In this case, the recipient SHOULD verify that the timestamp received in the encrypted message is within five minutes of the time stamped by the recipient’s server in the <delay/> element.

### 6 Mandatory-to-Implement Cryptographic Algorithms

All implementations MUST support the following algorithms. Implementations MAY support other algorithms as well.

- TBD (RSA/SHA1? RSASSA-RKCS1-v1_5? RSASSA-PSS?)

### 7 Certificates

To participate in end-to-end signing using the methods defined in this document, a client needs to possess an X.509 certificate. It is expected that many clients will generate their own (self-signed) certificates rather than obtain a certificate issued by a certification authority (CA). In any case the certificate MUST include an XMPP address that is represented using the ASN.1 Object Identifier "id-on-xmppAddr" as specified in Section 5.1.1 of RFC 3920bis.

### 8 Security Considerations

TBD.

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9 XMPP Registrar Considerations

9.1 XML Namespace Name for Signed Data in XMPP

A URN sub-namespace of signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as follows.

URI:  urn:xmpp:signed

Specification:  ProtoXEP

Description:  This is an XML namespace name of signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol as defined by ProtoXEP.

Registrant Contact:  XSF

10 Acknowledgements

This document borrows ideas and text from End-to-End Object Encryption “work in progress” by Matthew Miller and Peter Saint-Andre.