XEP-0364: Current Off-the-Record Messaging Usage

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This document outlines the current usage of Off-the-Record messaging in XMPP, its drawbacks, its strengths, and recommendations for improving the end user experience.
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1 Introduction

The Off-the-Record messaging protocol (OTR) was originally introduced in the 2004 paper *Off-the-Record Communication, or, Why Not To Use PGP* \(^1\) and has since become the de facto standard for performing end-to-end encryption in XMPP. OTR provides encryption, deniable authentication, forward secrecy, and malleable encryption. The OTR protocol itself is currently described by the document: *Off-the-Record Messaging Protocol version 3* \(^2\) and will not be redescribed here. Instead, this document aims to describe OTR’s usage and best practices within XMPP. It is not intended to be a current standard, or technical specification, as better (albeit, newer and less well tested) methods of end-to-end encryption exist for XMPP.

2 Overview

Though this document will not focus on the OTR protocol itself, a brief overview is warranted to better understand the protocols strengths and weaknesses. OTR uses 128 bit AES symmetric-key encryption and the SHA-1 hash function. An OTR session can be held only between two parties, meaning that OTR is incompatible with *Multi-User Chat (XEP-0045)* \(^3\) and *Mediated Information eXchange (MIX) (XEP-0369)* \(^4\). It provides deniability in the form of malleable encryption (a third party may generate fake messages after the session has ended). This means that if you were not a part of the original conversation, you cannot prove, based on captured messages alone, that a message from the conversation was actually sent by a given party. Unlike PGP, OTR also provides forward secrecy; even if a session is recorded and the primary key is compromised at a later date, the OTR messages will not be able to be decrypted as each was encrypted with an ephemeral key exchanged via Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a 1536 bit modulus.

3 Discovery

Clients that support the OTR protocol do not advertise it in any of the normal XMPP ways. Instead, OTR provides its own discovery mechanism. If a client wishes to indicate support for OTR they include a special whitespace tag in their messages. This tag can appear anywhere in the body of the message stanza, but it is most often found at the end. The OTR tag comprises the following bytes:

---


\(^2\) "Off-the-Record Messaging Protocol version 3" <https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.8.0.html>


4 OTR Messages

4.1 Construction and Decoding

Some clients in the wild have been known to insert XML in the <body> node of a message. Clients that support OTR should tolerate encrypted payloads which expand to unescaped XML, and treat it as plain text.
4.2 Routing

XMPP is designed so that the client needs to know very little about where and how a message will be routed. Generally, clients are encouraged to send messages to the bare JID and allow the server to route the messages as it sees fit. However, OTR requires that messages be sent to a particular resource. Therefore clients should send OTR messages to a full JID, possibly allowing the user to determine which resource they wish to start an encrypted session with. Furthermore, if a client receives a request to start an OTR session in a carboned message (due to a server which does not support the aforementioned "private" directive, or a client which does not set it), it should be silently ignored.

4.3 Processing Hints

Message Processing Hints (XEP-0334) 5 defines a set of hints for how messages should be handled by XMPP servers. These hints are not hard and fast rules, but suggestions which the servers may or may not choose to follow. Best practice is to include the following hints on all OTR messages:

```xml
<no-copy xmlns="urn:xmpp:hints"/>
<no-permanent-store xmlns="urn:xmpp:hints"/>
```

Similarly the "private" directive from Message Carbons (XEP-0280) 6 should also be included to indicate that carbons are not necessary (since no other resource will be able to read the message):

```xml
<private xmlns="urn:xmpp:carbons:2"/>
```

4.4 Explicit Message Encryption

Explicit Message Encryption (XEP-0380) 7 defines a hint to let clients without OTR support know that this message was encrypted, and display a friendly message instead of the raw encrypted data. It is RECOMMENDED that the client adds this hint alongside every encrypted message

```xml
<encryption xmlns="urn:xmpp:eme:0" namespace="urn:xmpp:otr:0"/>
```

All together, an example OTR message might look like this (with the majority of the body stripped out for readability):

---

5 OTR SESSIONS

Listing 6: OTR message with processing hints

```
<message from='malvolio@stewardsguild.lit/countesshousehold'
  to='olivia@countess.lit/veiled'>
  <body>OTOR v23...</body>
  <encryption xmlns="urn:xmpp:eme:0" namespace="urn:xmpp:otr:0"/>
  <no-copy xmlns="urn:xmpp:hints"/>
  <no-permanent-store xmlns="urn:xmpp:hints"/>
  <private xmlns="urn:xmpp:carbons:2"/>
</message>
```

4.5 Delivery Receipts

If a client supports OTR and Message Delivery Receipts (XEP-0184) it is RECOMMENDED that the client send a delivery receipt only after successfully decrypting an encrypted message.

5 OTR Sessions

5.1 Starting an OTR session

Most clients today provide options to automatically start an OTR session, to manually construct a session at the users request, or to always require the use of an OTR session even if the remote client does not support OTR.

In the interest of user experience, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to start an OTR session with a previously unseen resource or one for which we do not have OTR keys cached without first discovering if the remote end supports OTR using one of the mechanisms described in the "Discovery" section of this document except in security critical contexts where user experience is not a concern.

Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to always allow the user to manually start an OTR session and to indicate that OTR is known to be available when OTR support is discovered by any of the aforementioned mechanisms.

5.2 Ending an OTR session

It is RECOMMENDED that the lifetime of OTR sessions be limited to the lifetime of the XMPP session in which the OTR session was established. If a resource associated with either end of the OTR session goes offline (a closing stream tag is received, or a fatal stream error occurs), it is RECOMMENDED that the other end terminate the OTR session.

When an XMPP session that is hosting an OTR session ends, it is RECOMMENDED that XMPP session be completely torn down before the associated OTR session is ended. For instance, when receiving a closing stream tag, clients should send their own closing stream tag (as

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specified in RFC 6120 9), close the underlying TCP connection (or connections), and then terminate the OTR session in that order. This prevents a race condition in some clients that attempt to automatically establish an OTR session where the OTR session is torn down and then re-established by an incoming message before the XMPP session can be closed.

6 Use in XMPP URIs

RFC 5122 10 defines a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) and Internationalized Resource Identifier (IRI) scheme for XMPP entities, and XMPP URI Query Components (XEP-0147) 11 defines various query components for use with XMPP URI’s. When an entity has an associated OTR fingerprint its URI is often formed with "otr-fingerprint" in the query string. Eg.

Listing 7: OTR Fingerprint

```plaintext
xmpp:feste@allfools.lit?otr-fingerprint=AEAD503298797D4A4FC823BC12D4524BAC54338
```

The XMPP Registrar 12 maintains a registry of queries and key-value pairs for use in XMPP URIs at <https://xmpp.org/registrar/querytypes.html>. As of the date this document was authored, the 'otr-fingerprint' query string has not been formally defined and has therefore is not officially recognized by the registrar.

7 Acknowledgements

Thanks to Daniel Gultsch for his excellent article 13 on the pitfalls of implementing OTR, and to Georg Lukas and Chris Ballinger for their feedback and corrections.

8 Security Considerations

While this document describes an existing protocol which is streamed over XMPP and therefore does not introduce any new security concerns itself, it is worth mentioning a few security issues with the underlying OTR protocol:

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12 The XMPP Registrar maintains a list of reserved protocol namespaces as well as registries of parameters used in the context of XMPP extension protocols approved by the XMPP Standards Foundation. For further information, see <https://xmpp.org/registrar/>.
Because Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange is unauthenticated, the initial D-H exchange
which sets up the encrypted channel is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. No sensi-
tive information should be sent over the encrypted channel until mutual authentication has
been performed inside the encrypted channel.

OTR makes use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm. While no practical attacks have been observed in
SHA-1 at the time of this writing, theoretical attacks have been constructed, and attacks have
been performed on hash functions that are similar to SHA-1. One cryptographer estimated
that the cost of generating SHA-1 collisions was $2.77 million dollars in 2012, and would
drop to $700,000 by 2015. 14. This puts generating SHA-1 collisions well within the reach of
governments, malicious organizations, and even well-funded individuals.

9  IANA Considerations

This document requires no interaction with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).

10  XMPP Registrar Considerations

No namespaces or parameters need to be registered with the XMPP Registrar as a result of
this document.

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14 Bruce Schneier (2012-10-05). ”When Will We See Collisions for SHA-1” <https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_se.html>